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Comment
MERCY HOSPITAL, INC. v. JACKSON: A RECURRING
DILEMMA FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS IN
THE TREATMENT OF JEHOVAH'S
WITNESSES
DAVID

H.

BAMBERGER*

One of the most difficult medical legal problems confronting
hospitals and other health care providers is the treatment of Jehovah's Witnesses who are in need of a blood transfusion but who refuse that procedure on religious grounds. Approximately 650,000
Jehovah's Witnesses currently reside in the United States,' and one
of the fundamental tenets of their religion prohibits them from having blood transfusions under any circumstances. 2 In the event that a
Jehovah's Witness requires a blood transfusion to save the patient's
life, health care providers face a dilemma: they may accede to the
patient's refusal of the procedure, knowing that the patient may die,
or they may violate the patient's religious beliefs by administering a
blood transfusion against the patient's will. The former choice runs
contrary to the ethical orientation of the medical profession to preserve life and increases the likelihood of malpractice suits. On the
other hand, even if blood is given pursuant to a court order, the
procedure may violate the patient's constitutional rights and common-law rights to refuse treatment and to informed consent.
Until recently, the appellate courts of Maryland had not had occasion to offer any guidance to health care providers regarding this
recurring dilemma.' Unfortunately, when an opportunity to clarify
* Associate, Piper & Marbury, Baltimore, Md.; B.A., Trinity College, 1970; M.A.,
University of Toronto, 1971; J.D., with high honors, George Washington University,
1981.

1. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 49 (1986).
2. See generally WATCH TOWER BIBLE AND TRACT SOCIETY OF PENNSYLVANIA, BLOOD,
MEDICINE AND THE LAW OF GOD (1961). The passages from Scriptures upon which this
belief is based include Leviticus 17:10 and Acts 15:20, 28-29.
3. The only other case reaching the Court of Appeals of Maryland involving the
rights of a Jehovah's Witness to refuse a blood transfusion was Hamilton v. McAuliffe,
277 Md. 336, 353 A.2d 634 (1976). In that case, the Court of Appeals dismissed as moot
a declaratory judgment action brought nearly a year after the trial court had authorized a
transfusion for the patient. At least two Maryland trial court decisions have reached the
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the respective rights and obligations of health care providers and
their Jehovah's Witness patients arose in Mercy Hospital, Inc. v. Jackson, 4 the Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled that the controversy
was moot and refused to reach the merits of the case.
I.

THE JACKSON CASE

Ernestine Jackson was twenty-six weeks pregnant when she was
admitted to Mercy Hospital on February 26, 1984, as a result of premature labor. Due to the position of the fetus and the placenta, as
well as Mrs. Jackson's prior medical history, her physicians believed
that a vaginal delivery was contraindicated and that, regardless of
the method of delivery, there was a fifty percent likelihood that a
blood transfusion would be required.5 In her physicians' opinion,
Mrs. Jackson's failure to receive a needed blood transfusion would
not endanger the infant but likely would result in Mrs. Jackson's
death. 6 Mrs. Jackson stated that, on the basis of her religious beliefs, she would rather accept the risk of death than receive a blood
transfusion. Her physician had no reservation about her mental capacity and believed that she was alert, oriented, and capable of making such a decision. Mrs. Jackson's husband, also a Jehovah's
Witness, stated that he would support her decision and that, in the
event of her death, he would try his best to raise their child.'
Mercy Hospital petitioned the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
to have a temporary guardian appointed for Mrs. Jackson for the
purpose of giving consent to a blood transfusion for her, should one
merits in cases involving blood transfusions forJehovah's Witness patients. See Bon Secours Hospital v.Jackson, No. 44A/17/A53829 (Cir. Ct. for Baltimore City 1974) (refusing to order transfusion for 21-year-old male Jehovah's Witness); In re Fuentes, Equity
No. 85366 (Cir. Ct. for Montgomery County 1983) (then-Circuit Court Judge John F.
McAuliffe) (authorizing transfusions for a 28-year-old Jehovah's Witness after the birth
of her fifth child).
4. 306 Md. 556, 510 A.2d 562 (1986).
5. In connection with an earlier pregnancy, Mrs. Jackson had undergone surgery
for a myoma of the uterus, a tumor consisting of muscle tissue. Because of the previous
surgery, Mrs. Jackson faced a risk of a ruptured uterus if a vaginal delivery were attempted. On the other hand, a Caesarian delivery also posed a significant risk for Mrs.
Jackson if she would need a blood transfusion, because the placenta was positioned near
the area where a Caesarian incision would have to be made.
6. Mercy Hospital, Inc. v.Jackson, 62 Md. App. 409, 412 n.2, 489 A.2d 1130, 1131
n.2 (1985), vacated as moot, 306 Md. 556, 510 A.2d 562 (1986).
7. Mrs. Jackson's physicians and others testified concerning her condition at a hearing in her hospital room on February 26, 1984. The transcript of that hearing is contained in the record of In re Ernestine Jackson, No. 84060043/E 17362 (Cir. Ct. for
Baltimore City 1984).
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prove necessary.8 An emergency hearing was held at Mrs. Jackson's
bedside, at which time testimony was heard from Mrs. Jackson, her
husband, her physicians, and others. Following the hearing, Judge
Martin B. Greenfeld ruled that Mrs. Jackson was a competent, pregnant adult who had a right to refuse a blood transfusion in accordance with her religious beliefs, when that decision was made
knowingly and voluntarily and would not endanger the delivery, survival, or support of the fetus.' In so ruling, Judge Greenfeld noted
that the Court of Appeals had not yet had occasion to decide the
issue and that there was no unanimity of opinion in similar cases
from other jurisdictions. Mrs. Jackson underwent a Caesarian section and delivered her infant without requiring a blood transfusion,
and both survived and were released from the hospital.
Mercy Hospital appealed the trial court's decision to the Court
of Special Appeals. Although court-appointed counsel for Mrs.
Jackson filed a motion asking the court to dismiss the appeal as
moot on the grounds that Mrs. Jackson no longer required the medical treatment at issue and that it was extremely unlikely that Mrs.
Jackson would seek such treatment again, the hospital and amicus,
the State of Maryland, argued that the issues presented were likely
to recur and should be decided. The Court of Special Appeals
agreed that it should reach the merits and affirmed Judge Greenfeld's decision. 10 Subsequently, Mercy Hospital filed a petition for a
writ 6f certiorari, which was granted by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland. "
In the Court of Appeals, in addition to the briefs of the parties,
briefs were filed by amici University of Maryland Medical System
Corporation and the State of Maryland. Mercy Hospital and both
amici urged the Court of Appeals to reach the merits of the case.
8. Because of the emergency circumstances, Mercy Hospital orally petitioned the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City for appointment of a temporary guardian for Mrs. Jackson. That petition was denied. Thereafter, Mercy Hospital filed a written petition nunc
pro tunc. The legal basis upon which the hospital petitioned the court was MD. EST. &
TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-709(c) (1974), as well as the court's general equity jurisdiction.
Section 13-709 allows a court to order emergency protective services for an adult lacking capacity to consent when no other person authorized to give consent is available.
Section 13-709 was inapposite, however, because the trial court found that Mrs. Jackson
was fully competent.
9. On March 1, 1984, Judge Greenfeld entered a Memorandum and Order as of
February 26, 1984, nunc pro tunc. That Memorandum and Order was filed on March 5,
1984, and is contained in the record of In re Ernestine Jackson, No. 84060043/E 17362
(Cir. Ct. for Baltimore City 1984).
10. Mercy Hospital, Inc. v.Jackson, 62 Md. App. 409, 489 A.2d 1130 (1985), vacated
as moot, 306 Md. 556, 510 A.2d 562 (1986).
11. 304 Md. 47, 497 A.2d 484 (1985).
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Moreover, in contrast to the position taken by Mrs. Jackson in the
Court of Special Appeals, counsel for Mrs. Jackson agreed with
Mercy Hospital and both amici that the Court of Appeals should
decide the case even though the specific controversy was moot. 2
The Court of Appeals refused to find that the Jackson controversy was one of those "rare instances" when the court ought to
reach the merits of a moot case. 13 The court referred to its earlier
decision in Hamilton v. McAuliffe 4 for the proposition that blood
transfusion controversies are so dependent upon the particular factual circumstances of each case that any ruling on the merits in the
Jackson case would afford little guidance to trial judges or parties in
future cases.' 5 The Court of Appeals also relied upon its established policy of deciding constitutional issues only when
6
necessary.'
In a strongly worded dissent, Judge McAuliffe stated that the
Jackson case, while clearly moot, presented a "textbook example" of
when an appellate court should express its view on important questions of substantial public concern which, although presented in a
moot case, are "capable of repetition, yet evading review."' 7 Judge
McAuliffe noted that cases like the one at bar arise under emergency
conditions that do not permit adequate briefing, oral argument, and
"unhurried contemplation" of the issues.'" Judge McAuliffe further
observed that, although the precise facts of this case may not recur,
the fundamental issues will; therefore, trial judges, attorneys, health
care providers, and other interested persons are in immediate need
of guidance on those issues.1 9
The remainder of this comment will be devoted to an examination of the issues raised by theJackson case, a review of rules of decision employed by courts in other jurisdictions, and a brief
commentary regarding the application of that jurisprudence to the
12. 306 Md. at 560-61, 510 A.2d at 564.
13. Id. at 562-63, 510 A.2d at 565.
14. 277 Md. 336, 353 A.2d 634 (1976).
15. 306 Md. at 563, 510 A.2d at 565.

16. Id. at 565, 510 A.2d at 566.
17. Id. (McAuliffe, J., dissenting); accordJohn F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston,
58 NJ. 576, 579, 279 A.2d 670, 671 (1971) ("The controversy is moot ....
Nonetheless, the public interest warrants a resolution .... "); In re Estate of Dorone, 349 Pa.
Super. 59, 66, 502 A.2d 1271, 1275 (1985) ("there is a large class of otherJehovah's
Witnesses, and it is reasonably likely that at least some of these will be involved in emergencies in which a doctor will seek a court order authorizing a transfusion") (emphasis
in original), appeal granted, 515 A.2d 893 (Pa. 1986).
18. 306 Md. at 567, 510 A.2d at 567 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
19. Id.
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Jackson case and the refusal by the Court of Appeals of Maryland to
offer guidance relating to these matters.
II.

THE PATIENT'S COMMON-LAw RIGHTS TO REFUSE TREATMENT,

TO INFORMED CONSENT, AND TO EMERGENCY TREATMENT

In the Jackson case the trial judge held that Mrs. Jackson was a

competent, pregnant adult who had a "paramount right" to refuse a
blood transfusion on the basis of her religious beliefs, as long as
that decision was knowing and voluntary and would not endanger
the fetus. It is not entirely clear whether this "paramount right"
that Judge Greenfeld discerned is one founded in the federal Constitution or in the common law or both. In any event, such rights
have been founded upon both sources by courts in other
jurisdictions.
It appears doubtful, absent court involvement, that state action
ordinarily is implicated in the relationship between a patient and a
health care provider.2 ° It is well settled that the first and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution prohibit only governmental infringement of the free exercise of religion, and that no
first or fourteenth amendment issue is raised with regard to a dispute between private parties. 21 A similar requirement of state action also applies with regard to other rights protected by the
fourteenth amendment, such as the right to privacy.2 2 Nevertheless,
even in the absence of state involvement, patients have certain common-law rights that are deemed to arise out of the traditional physician-patient relationship.
The common law recognizes that a patient has a right to refuse
treatment and to determine what shall be done with one's own
body.23 For example, in Erickson v. Dilgard,24 a competent, adult Je20. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-10 (1982) (holding that there was
no state action in decisions by nursing homes to transfer or discharge patients, even
though nursing homes are subject to state regulation); Shorter v. Drury, 103 Wash. 2d
645, 695 P.2d 116, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 86 (1985) (holding that a wrongful death malpractice action by spouse of Jehovah's Witness was a dispute between private parties).
But see Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (holding that
pervasive regulation of hospitals provides "state action").
21. Massachusetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers, 183 F.2d 497, 501
(lst Cir. 1950); United States Nat'l Bank of Portland v. Snodgrass, 202 Or. 530, 543, 275
P.2d 860, 866 (1954).
22. In re Welfare of Coyler, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
23. As stated by Judge Cardozo in Schloendorffv. New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125,
129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914), overruled on other grounds, Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656,
143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957): "Every human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who
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hovah's Witness refused a blood transfusion considered medically
necessary in connection with an operation. The court refused to order the transfusion, holding that it is the patient who must have the
"final say" in a medical decision concerning him or her.2 5 This
principle also has been generally recognized by those who regulate
the medical profession.2 6
Another common-law right, corollary to the adult patient's
right to refuse treatment, is the patient's right to informed consent
regarding proposed treatment. In Maryland the seminal case on informed consent is Sard v. Hardy.2 7 In that case the Court of Appeals
ruled that a physician cannot properly undertake to perform surgery
or administer therapy without the prior consent of the adult patient
after a fair and reasonable explanation of the proposed treatment. 28
The Court of Appeals explained that this rule is founded upon an
performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is
liable in damages."
24. 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1967).
25. Id. at 28, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 706; see also In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282,
383 A.2d 785 (1978) (refusing on constitutional grounds to order amputation of gangrenous feet of 72-year-old patient).
26. See Point No. 4 of Patient'sBill of Rights (adopted by The American Hospital Association in 1975), made applicable to hospitals in Maryland by MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE
ANN. § 19-308(a)(1) and COMAR § 10.07.01.09 ("The patient has the right to refuse
treatment to the extent permitted by law and to be informed of the medical consequences of his action."). But see 1985 ACCREDITATION MANUAL OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON
ACCREDITATION Or HosPiTALs [hereinafter JCAH MANUAL] (when patient's refusal of
treatment prevents the provision of appropriate care in accordance with professional
standards, the physician may terminate the relationship with the patient upon reasonable notice).
27. 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977).
28. Id. at 439, 379 A.2d at 1019. In Maryland, under certain circumstances, substituted consent may be given on behalf of a patient unable to make or communicate a
responsible decision. See MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-107(c)(3) (1982). That section provides for substituted consent on behalf of "disabled individuals" and for treatment of "disabled individuals" without consent in cases of medical emergencies.
Subsection (b) of that section provides, however, that treatment is not authorized if the
health care provider knows that the treatment is contrary to the religious belief of the
disabled person. Section 20-107(f)(2) provides that substituted consent may not be
used if the health care provider is aware that the patient has expressed disagreement
with the decision to provide treatment. Section 20-102 of the Health-General Article
identifies the circumstances in which a minor is deemed to have the same capacity as an
adult to consent to medical treatment. See also Wentzel v. Montgomery General Hosp.,
Inc., 293 Md. 685, 447 A.2d 1244 (1982) (holding that equity court has common-law
parens patriae power over incompetent minors and may authorize a guardian to consent
to medical procedure), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147 (1983); cf. In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744
(D.C. 1979) (holding that adult mental patient who had rejected use of psychotropic
drugs on religious grounds prior to incompetency had right to refuse medical treatment,
and court should use substituted judgment approach to determine what choice individual would make if currently competent).
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adult patient's right to exercise control over one's own body "at
least when undergoing elective surgery." 2 9 Thus, the physician in
Sard was found to have a duty to explain the procedure to the patient and to warn the patient of any material risks or dangers inherent in or collateral to the therapy, in order to enable the patient to
make an intelligent and informed choice about whether or not to
undergo the treatment.3 0 A material risk was defined by the court in
Sard as "one which a physician knows or ought to know would be
significant to a reasonable person in the patient's position in deciding whether or not to submit to a particular medical treatment or
procedure. 3 ' The Court of Appeals was careful to caution, however, that the duty of disclosure is suspended when an emergency
32
exists and it is impractical to obtain the patient's consent.
In addition to the rights to refuse treatment and to informed
consent, courts in certain jurisdictions also have found that patients
may have a common-law right to receive treatment in emergency
situations. Traditionally, the common-law rule has been that private
hospitals have no duty to maintain emergency rooms and that no
person has the right to demand admission to a hospital.3 3 However,
in recent years, courts in various jurisdictions have demonstrated an
increasing reluctance to permit hospitals to turn away patients, at
least in the context of medical emergencies.3 4 Thus, a patient in
29. 281 Md. at 439, 379 A.2d at 1019.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 444, 379 A.2d at 1022.
32. Id. at 445, 379 A.2d at 1022.
33. E.g., Birmingham Baptist Hosp. v. Crews, 229 Ala. 398, 157 So. 224 (1934); McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876), overruled on othergrounds,
Colby v. Carney Hospital, 356 Mass. 527, 254 N.E.2d 407 (1969); VanCampen v. Olean
General Hosp., 210 A.D. 204, 205 N.Y.S. 554 (1924), aft'd, 239 N.Y. 615, 147 N.E. 219
(1925).
The law historically has refused to impose upon a stranger the obligation to go to
the aid of another human being, even if the other is in mortal danger. PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 375 (5th ed. 1984). However, if a "good samaritan"
attempts to help another, he or she may assume a liability that did not attach originally.
Id. at 378.
In Maryland, under certain circumstances, a "good samaritan" physician may be
protected from civil liability for acts or omissions in rendering assistance or medical
care. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-309 (1984 & Supp. 1986). However, § 5309 protects a physician only for care provided "at the scene of an emergency," "in
transit to a medical facility," or "through communications with personnel providing
emergency assistance." Although apparently no cases have construed this portion of
§ 5-309, it appears that the statute would not apply to physicians who provide emergency care in a hospital. Furthermore, § 5-309 applies only when the assistance or medical care is provided without fee or compensation. Because hospitals ordinarily charge a
fee for emergency room care, the statute would seem inapplicable in such cases.
34. See Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hosp., 112 Ariz. 104, 537 P.2d 1329 (1975) (pri-
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Mrs. Jackson's circumstances has a right under common law to refuse treatment, a right to informed consent and, at least in some
jurisdictions, a right to emergency treatment.
III.

THE PATIENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO THE FREE
EXERCISE OF RELIGION AND TO PRIVACY MUST BE
BALANCED AGAINST THE INTERESTS
OF THE STATE

Other rights that arise under the Constitution become implicated once there is the requisite state action, either through invocation of the state judicial system or through some other nexus with
the state.3 5 Those constitutional rights include the right to the free
36
exercise of religion under the first and fourteenth amendments
and the right to privacy.3 7
In the instant case the trial court apparently based its refusal to
order Mrs. Jackson to undergo a blood transfusion in part on her
vate hospital had duty to treat every patient when public policy had been declared by
statute or otherwise); Stanturfv. Sipes, 447 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. 1969) (reversing summary
judgment for defendant and finding plaintiff could have relied on known policy of hospital to treat); cf. JCAH MANUAL, supra note 26, at 17 ("any individual who comes to the
hospital for emergency medical evaluation or initial treatment shall be properly assessed
by qualified individuals, and appropriate services shall be rendered within the defined
capability of the hospital"). See generally Annotation, Liability of HospitalforRefusal to Admit
or Treat Patient, 35 A.L.R.3d 841 (1971 & Supp. 1986).
In Wilmington General Hosp. v. Manlove, 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961), the
Supreme Court of Delaware cited dictum in Levin v. Sinai Hosp., 186 Md. 174, 46 A.2d
298 (1946), for the proposition that a private hospital is under no common-law duty to
serve everyone who seeks treatment. However, the court in Manlove ruled that a hospital
may be liable for refusing to treat a patient when an unmistakable emergency exists if
the patient has or could have relied upon a well-established custom of the hospital to
render aid in such a case. 54 Del. at 25, 174 A.2d at 140.
35. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
36. The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent
part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... "
The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution makes this first amendment protection applicable to action by the state as well. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296,
303 (1940).
37. Certain courts have concluded that, in addition to a first amendment right to the
free exercise of religion, patients have a right to privacy under the fourteenth amendment, permitting them to be free from nonconsensual invasion of their bodily integrity.
See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033 (Miss. 1985); cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) (right of privacy in abortion decision); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (right of marital privacy regarding use of contraceptives); Union Pacific Ry. v.
Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (discussing common-law right to be free from nonconsensual invasions); Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193
(1890) (same).
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constitutional right to free exercise of her religion. Courts generally
have recognized, however, that this right is not absolute.3 8 In determining whether to order an adult patient to submit to a blood transfusion over the patient's objection on religious grounds, courts
must balance the interests of the state against the patient's constitutional rights. Only those state interests that are "compelling" are
deemed to outweigh legitimate claims to the free exercise of
religion.3 9
Even though courts have arrived at varying and occasionally inconsistent results based upon the facts of different cases, there is
general agreement in all jurisdictions as to those state interests that
must be considered in determining whether to order a patient to
undergo a blood transfusion against the patient's religious beliefs.
Those state interests include: (1) the protection of innocent third
parties, (2) maintaining the integrity of medical practice, (3) the
preservation of life, and (4) the prevention of suicide.40
A.

ProtectingInnocent Third Parties

Courts have balanced the interests of the state against the patient's rights with varying results that appear to depend upon the
unique facts and circumstances of each case. However, the factor
that most frequently appears to determine the outcome of this balancing test is the presence of minor children or other innocent third
parties whom the state has a duty to protect. 4 1 For example, one of
38. Whereas freedom of religious belief may be absolute, religious conduct has been
held subject to regulation for the protection of society. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. at 303-04; see Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (holding that court may
preserve community morality by prohibiting religious practice of bigamy); Lawson v.
Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942) (holding that court may protect
the public from poisonous snakes used in religious ritual); cf. Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11 (1905) (holding that state law requiring individuals to submit to vaccination
did not violate right to liberty under fourteenth amendment).
39. McMillan v. State, 258 Md. 147, 152, 265 A.2d 453, 456 (1970); see Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (holding that Wisconsin law requiring attendance in
school until age sixteen infringed upon religious freedom of Amish parents who refused
on religious grounds to send children to public school beyond the eighth grade); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that Seventh Day Adventist discharged for
refusal to work on Saturday was improperly denied unemployment compensation).
40. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379
So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373
Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); see generally Annotation, Power of Court or Other Public
Agency to OrderMedical Treatment Over Religious Objectionsfor Child Whose Life Is not Immediately Endangered, 52 A.L.R.3d 1118 (1973 & Supp. 1986) and 97 A.L.R.3d 421 (1980 &
Supp. 1986).
41. In cases in which the patient is a minor, the courts uniformly have held that,
despite parents' religious convictions to the contrary, medical treatment may be ordered

1987]

MERCY HOSPITAL, INC. V. JACKSON

523

the leading cases in which a court found the state's interests sufficiently compelling to merit a court-ordered transfusion, despite the
patient's opposition on religious grounds, is Raleigh Fitkin-PaulMorgan Memorial Hospitalv. Anderson."2 In that case a pregnant Jehovah's
Witness refused a blood transfusion, despite advice that both
mother and child would die if the procedure were not done.43 The
trial court had refused to order the transfusion on the ground that it
is improper for the judiciary to intervene in the case of an adult or
with respect to an unborn child.4 4 The Supreme Court of New
Jersey reversed the lower court's decision, holding that the unborn
child was entitled to the law's protection. 4 5 The court expressly reserved decision on the issue of whether an adult may be ordered to
submit to a blood transfusion if the life of a child is not at stake.4 6
Similarly, in other cases in which the patient already is the parent of a minor child, courts have ordered medically necessary blood
transfusions for the parent, despite the patient's religious objection
and even though the lack of a transfusion did not directly threaten
the child's life or health. The courts' concern has been not only for
the physical health of the child, but also for the quality of the child's
life and the upbringing that the child would have if the parent were
to die.4 7
In contrast, in cases in which the patient has no minor children,
courts more readily have honored the patient's objection to a blood
to save the life of the patient. See, e.g., Levitsky v. Levitsky, 231 Md. 388, 398, 190 A.2d
621, 625-26 (1963) (holding that court may protect a child by an appropriate order
when parental views pose a serious danger to the life or health of the child); Craig v.
State, 220 Md. 590, 596, 155 A.2d 684, 687-88 (1959) (holding that parents have an
implied duty under Maryland statute to provide minor children with medical care pursuant to MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1 (1957), now codified at MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.
§ 5-203 (1984)).
42. 42 NJ. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
43. Id. at 422, 201 A.2d at 537-38.
44. Id. at 423, 201 A.2d at 538.
45. Id.; accord Application of Jamaica Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898
(1985).
46. 42 N.J. at 423, 201 A.2d at 538; see also infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331
F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) (when a patient was in extremis and
neither patient nor husband would permit a transfusion, ordering transfusion on the
basis of the state's interest in preserving the life of the mother and not permitting her to
"abandon" her seven-month-old child); In re Winthrop University Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d
804, 490 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1985) (holding that patient had responsibility to the community
to care for her infant); Powell v. Columbian Presbyterian Medical Center, 49 Misc. 2d
215, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450 (1965) (ordering transfusion for Jehovah's Witness who was
mother of six by rationalizing that the patient "did not object" to receiving a transfusion
although she "would not ...

direct its use").
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transfusion on religious grounds. For example, in In re Brooks' Estate4 8 a competent, adult Jehovah's Witness with no minor children
refused a blood transfusion on religious grounds and signed a document releasing the health care providers from liability. 4 9 Nevertheless, the lower court appointed a conservator, and the transfusion
was given over the patient's objection.5" On appeal the Supreme
Court of Illinois held that the lower court had erred in ordering the
transfusion. 5 ' In so ruling the court distinguished another often
cited case, Application of Presidentand Directorsof Georgetown College,52 in
which the patient was the mother of minor children who could have
become wards of the state if the patient had died.53
In another case involving a childless patient, In re Melideo,5 4 the
court upheld the right of the patient to refuse a blood transfusion
on religious grounds, finding that there was no overriding, compelling state interest.5 5 As in the Brooks case, the court indicated that its
decision might have been different if the patient were pregnant or
the mother of young children. 5 6
There are occasional exceptions to this general pattern of rulings upholding the rights of childless patients to refuse blood transfusions and ordering transfusions for those patients with minor
children. One such exception is In re Osborne,57 in which the court
upheld the right of a thirty-four year old Jehovah's Witness to refuse
a blood transfusion, even though she was the mother of two young
children. The court relied upon evidence and testimony in the record that the patient had a close extended family and that, should the
patient die, the children would be well cared for, and the family
business would supply the material needs of the children.5"
A similar result was reached in a recent opinion involving a
competent, twenty-seven year old Jehovah's Witness who refused a
48. 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
49. Id. at 362-63, 205 N.E.2d at 436-37.
50. Id. at 363-64, 205 N.E.2d at 437.
51. Id. at 374, 205 N.E.2d at 443.
52. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
53. 32 Ill. 2d at 369, 205 N.E.2d at 439. The court in Brooks applied a "clear and
present danger" standard in balancing the interests involved. Most courts have applied
a "compelling state interest" test rather than a "clear and present danger" test in balancing the rights of the patient against those of the state. Id. at 372, 205 N.E.2d at 441;
see Case Note, 44 TEX. L. REV. 190, 191-92 (1965).
54. 88 Misc. 2d 974, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1976).
55. Id. at 975, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 524.
56. Id.
57. 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972).
58. Id. at 374.
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blood transfusion on religious grounds, knowing that he would die
without it. In that case, St. Mary's Hospital v. Ramsey, 59 the court expressed its concern that the patient had a daughter for whom he was
obligated to pay fifty dollars per week in child support. 60 However,
the court concluded that the state's interests did not outweigh the
patient's right to refuse a transfusion, since the daughter resided
with the mother in another state, and there were other means of
support available for the child. 6 '
B.

Preservingthe Integrity of Medical Practice

Although the protection of minors is most often the determinative factor for a court in deciding whether to order a patient to undergo a blood transfusion against religious beliefs, many courts also
have voiced substantial concern about the impact on the integrity of
medical practice of requiring physicians to respect a patient's refusal
of a blood transfusion. For example, in John F. Kennedy Memorial
Hospital v. Heston 62 the Supreme Court of New Jersey had occasion
to address the question that it had reserved in the Raleigh-Fitkin
case.6" In Heston a twenty-two year old unmarried and childless Jehovah's Witness was injured in an automobile accident and required
a blood transfusion. The patient was incapacitated, and her mother
refused to consent to the procedure.' The hospital applied to the
court, which appointed a guardian, and as a result of court-ordered
surgery and blood transfusion, the patient survived.6 5 On appeal the
appellate court upheld the lower court's decision, largely on the basis of the state's interest in preserving the integrity of medical practice. 6 6 The court noted that hospitals, physicians, and other health
care providers are dedicated to preserving life and that they should
not be asked to operate under the strain of knowing that a blood
59. 465 So. 2d 666 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1985).
60. Id. at 668.
61. Id. The Ramsey court concluded that the state and hospital had not demonstrated
sufficiently compelling interests to outweigh Mr. Ramsey's deeply held religious convictions. However, the court was sufficiently concerned with the dilemma to certify the
question presented to the Supreme Court of Florida. The latter court, in Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aft'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980), had
called for examination of these "inscrutable problems" on a case-by-case basis. 379 So.
2d at 361. As of this date, there apparently has been no reported decision by the
Supreme Court of Florida on the certified question in the Ramsey case.
62. 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
63. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
64. 58 NJ. at 578, 279 A.2d at 671.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 582-83, 279 A.2d at 673.
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transfusion may not be administered even though it may be medically necessary to save the patient's life." The court further reasoned that, although a prior application to a court is appropriate if
time permits, in an emergency a hospital and its staff must be permitted to pursue their functions in accordance with their professional standards.6 8
A similar concern for the integrity of medical practice was expressed in United States v. George.69 In that case the court ordered a
blood transfusion for a coherent and rational Jehovah's Witness
who was the father of four children. The court held that the physician's conscience and professional oath must be respected and that
a patient may0 decline treatment but "may not demand
mistreatment."

7

Underlying the rationale of protecting the integrity of medical
practice is a judicial concern that hospitals and physicians may be
held accountable for adverse results that would have been avoidable
if the health care providers were not compelled to honor the patient's religious objections. For example, in Crouse-Irving Memorial
Hospital v. Paddock 7t a hospital and attending physicians were permitted to continue to administer blood transfusions in order to stabilize a pregnant woman's condition, even though the patient
objected to the procedure on religious grounds. The court pointed
out that the patient wanted the hospital and her doctors to take aggressive medical steps to ensure a proper delivery, including a surgical procedure that could result in her loss of a life-threatening
amount of blood. Nevertheless, the patient did not want the medical personnel to correct a possibly grave condition that might be
encountered unavoidably in the process.7 2 The court distinguished
a patient's simply declining a medical procedure from a patient's
asking that the procedure be done but only in a certain manner or
subject to certain limitations. 73

67. Id. at 582, 279 A.2d at 673.
68. Id. at 583, 279 A.2d at 673.
69. 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965).
70. Id. at 754; cf. In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1041 (Miss. 1985) (holding that
patient may specify conditions of treatment, but health care providers may decline to
treat if they conclude that conditions are unacceptable).
71. 127 Misc. 2d 101, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1985).
72. Id. at 103, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 445.
73. Id.; see also Davis v. United States, 629 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd without opinion,
802 F.2d 463 (8th Cir. 1986) (dismissing malpractice action by Jehovah's Witnesses
when patient's religious convictions "made it impossible to handle the case in accordance with the then-accepted medical standards"); George, 239 F. Supp. at 754.
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Another case, Shorter v. Druty, 7 1 further illustrates that permitting a patient to dictate the specific procedures that a physician may
employ in the course of requested treatment may subject the physician and hospital to inevitable claims of malpractice. Shorter was a
wrongful death medical malpractice action brought by a husband
whose wife died as a result of hemorrhage. The wife had undergone
a dilatation and curettage procedure in which her uterus was severely perforated, allegedly due to the doctor's negligence.7 5 Prior
to the surgery, Mr. and Mrs. Shorter had executed a document releasing the hospital, its personnel, and the attending physician from
any responsibility for an adverse result arising out of their refusal to
consent to a blood transfusion should one prove necessary. 76 During the course of the procedure, the patient and her husband continued their refusal to authorize a blood transfusion despite
repeated warnings by the doctors that she likely would die from severe blood loss. Expert witnesses on both sides agreed that, in all
probability, a transfusion would have saved Mrs. Shorter's life. 7 7
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but reduced the
wrongful death damages by seventy-five percent on the ground that
the Shorters had assumed the risk that Mrs. Shorter would die from
loss of blood. On appeal the Supreme Court of Washington (en
banc) ruled that the release document was valid, since it was signed
knowingly and voluntarily. 78 The court affirmed the judgment on
the jury verdict, holding that although the Shorters did not assume
the risk of the surgeon's negligence, they did assume the risk of
death as a consequence of their refusal to permit a blood
transfusion.7 9
Despite some disagreement among courts as to whether the
state's interest in preserving the integrity of medical practice is sufficiently compelling to override a patient's religious objection, even
those courts that have not so found agree that medical personnel
should not be held either criminally responsible or civilly liable for
acceding to the refusal of a competent adult to undergo necessary
74. 103 Wash. 2d 645, 695 P.2d 116, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 86 (1985).
75. Id. at 649, 695 P.2d at 119.
76. Id. at 648-49, 695 P.2d at 119.
77. Id. at 649, 695 P.2d at 119.
78. Id. at 651-52, 695 P.2d at 120.
79. Id. at 658, 695 P.2d at 124; cf. Randolph v. City of New York, 117 A.D.2d 44, 501
N.Y.S.2d 837 (1986) (reversing judgment on jury verdict for the plaintiff patient in
wrongful death medical malpractice action in which physician obeyed patient's directive
not to give her transfusion, despite complications during Caesarian section, until it was
too late to save the patient's life).
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medical treatment.

C. Preserving Life and Preventing Suicide
The state's interest in preserving life has been cited by a few
courts in connection with a patient's refusal on religious grounds to
undergo a blood transfusion."' Typically, however, courts defer to
the patient's religious objection unless the state's interest in protecting minor children or in preserving the integrity of the medical profession is implicated as well. 2
Although the state's interest in preventing suicide also has been
mentioned by courts in connection with Jehovah's Witnesses who
have refused blood transfusions, in most instances that consideration is inapposite." For example, in theJackson case it was clear that
Mrs. Jackson did not want to die, and she willingly accepted treatment other than a blood transfusion. The state's interest in the prevention of suicide probably is more appropriately considered in the
context of cases involving terminally ill patients, and, even then,
courts have held that "suicide" encompasses only purposeful selfdestruction 4 and not the mere refusal of life-sustaining medical
treatment.

8

80. See, e.g., St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666, 669 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985);JCAH MANUAL, supra note 26, at xii ("the patient is responsible for his actions if

he refuses treatment or does not follow the practitioner's instructions"). See generally
Byrn, Compulsory Life Saving Treatmentfor the Competent Adult, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 31-32
(1975) (stating that a physician should not be required to undertake a course of treatment contrary to good medical judgment; conversely, a patient's rejection of reasonable
treatment relieves the physician of liability for damages resulting from failure to treat).
81. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379
So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373
Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
82. See, e.g., Ramsey, 465 So. 2d at 669 (holding that the state's interest in preserving
life is compelling but not an "unswerving mandate");John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp.
v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 579-83, 279 A.2d 670, 671-73 (1971).
83. See, e.g., Ramsey, 465 So. 2d at 669 (holding the state interest in preventing suicide inapposite, since it was clear that Mr. Ramsey did not want to die, and, other than
the transfusion, he willingly accepted medical treatment). But see Heston, 58 N.J. at 580,
279 A.2d at 672 (observing that there is no constitutional right to choose to die, that
attempted suicide is a crime at common law and under New Jersey statutory law, and
that the state has an interest in sustaining life).
84. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 350-51, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (1985) ("right to die"
case in which court held that evidence was not sufficient to allow termination of lifesustaining treatment).
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THE CIRCUIT COURT AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS IN
THE JACKSON CASE APPARENTLY FAILED TO CONSIDER THE
STATE'S INTEREST IN PRESERVING THE INTEGRITY
OF MEDICAL PRACTICE

In the Jackson case the trial court took into account the interests
of the patient and her unborn child. Judge Greenfeld found factually that Mrs. Jackson was competent and that her decision was
made knowingly and voluntarily and would not endanger the delivery, survival, or support of her child. He further found that Mrs.
Jackson's husband would rear and support the child if Mrs. Jackson
did not survive and that Mr. Jackson was fully capable of assuming
that responsibility. Thus, Judge Greenfeld apparently concluded
that the state's interest in protecting minor children would be adequately served, even if Mrs. Jackson had died as a result of her refusal of a blood transfusion. 5 The trial court also expressly took
into account Mrs. Jackson's common-law rights to informed consent
and to refuse treatment.8 6
As to the state's interests, both the Circuit Court and the Court
of Special Appeals apparently adopted the reasoning of those courts
that have held that the state's interest in preserving life alone is not
sufficient to override a patient's religious objections to a blood
transfusion. It is undisputed that Mrs. Jackson wanted to live, and,
therefore, the state's interest in preventing suicide simply did not
apply.
Significantly, however, neither the trial court's decision nor that
of the Court of Special Appeals addressed the state's interest in preserving the integrity of medical practice. This omission is particularly unfortunate given the dilemma that confronts hospital health
care providers in Maryland.

85. Cf Cantor, A Patient'sDecision To Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservationof Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228, 253-54 (1973) (arguing that the
economic factors justifying intervention on an "avoidance of public wards" theory
should be approached on a case-by-case basis and the economic circumstances sifted in
each instance). In the instant case Judge Greenfeld asked Mr. Jackson whether he was in
a position to care for and raise the child if Mrs. Jackson should die. Mr. Jackson stated
that he would try his best. Mr. Jackson testified that he worked full time and lived with
his parents. There was no testimony as to whether other members of the family would
have been available to stay with the child or, if not, whether Mr. Jackson or his family
could afford to hire someone to care for the child.
86. In re Ernestine Jackson, No. 84060043/E-17362 (Cir. Ct. for Baltimore City
1984).
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THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE REACHED THE MERITS

IN ORDER TO PROVIDE MUCH NEEDED GUIDANCE FOR
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS

The Jackson case represented an opportunity for the Court of
Appeals to provide guidance for hospitals and physicians with regard to the recurring and difficult issues relating to the treatment of
Jehovah's Witnesses. One of the foremost concerns of health care
providers in such cases is the fear of civil liability. Under certain
circumstances, a physician may be protected from civil liability for
acts or omissions in giving assistance or medical care, pursuant to
the Maryland "Good Samaritan" statute."7 However, that statute
provides such protection only under limited circumstances and, apparently, the statute would not protect physicians who provide
emergency care in a hospital.8 " Additionally, as discussed above,
hospital health care providers face a trend in the case law toward
imposing upon them a duty to treat in an unmistakable emergency."9 To complicate matters further, there is often no time in an
emergency for health care providers to apply to a court for a determination of the complex legal and ethical issues.9 ° Thus, medical
personnel have legitimate concerns regarding their duty to treat patients in an emergency and the possible consequences of failing to
provide such treatment. If they administer a blood transfusion over
the patient's objection, they may be found civilly liable for violating
the patient's common-law and constitutional rights. On the other
hand, if they abide by the patient's wishes, they act contrary to the
general ethical canon of the medical profession to preserve life and
face an increased risk of malpractice suits.
Public policy requires that physicians be encouraged to provide
prompt, medically appropriate treatment in emergencies without
excessive rumination about their potential liability for providing
that treatment. Regardless of whether the Court of Appeals would
have found Mrs. Jackson's right to refuse a blood transfusion on
religious grounds paramount to the state's interest in preserving the
integrity of medical practice, in the course of balancing those interests the court could have clarified the respective rights and obligations of the parties. Moreover, the court could have offered
87. MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-309 (Supp. 1986).
88. See supra note 33.
89. See supra note 34.
90. Mrs. Jackson was in labor on February 26, 1984. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in the Jackson case was filed on June 30, 1986.

1987]

MERCY HOSPITAL, INC. V. JACKSON

531

guidance as to how the state's interest in preserving the integrity of
medical practice might be protected in such cases.
One possible mechanism for protecting that interest and encouraging appropriate medical treatment for Jehovah's Witnesses
could be the use of a release form similar to the document held to
be valid in Shorter v. Drury.9 ' A substantially similar release has been
recommended by Jehovah's Witness literature. 92 That document acknowledges the difficult position of physicians who may be subject
to malpractice claims for failure to use all available procedures.9 3 In
the absence of such a mechanism, health care providers who are requested by a competent patient to withhold a medically necessary
blood transfusion may be required to respect the patient's refusal of
treatment contrary to their best medical judgment and yet be exposed to liability for doing so. Obviously, such a situation is both
unfair and untenable. One possible result of the concern of physicians and hospitals could be an increasing unwillingness to treat Jehovah's Witnesses, a result that would be unfortunate for all
concerned. Timely guidance by the Court of Appeals might have
served to mitigate the risk of that possible consequence of this com91. 103 Wash. 2d 645, 651-52, 695 P.2d 116, 120 (1985). The court in Shorter refused to construe the document as a release from liability for negligence and, therefore,
reserved any comment on whether a release that purported to absolve the physician
from liability for negligence would have been valid. Id. Generally, most courts have
considered releases from liability for negligence to be void as against public policy. See
Annotation, Validity and Constructionof Contract Exempting Hospital or Doctorfrom Liabilityfor
Negligence to Patient, 6 A.L.R.3d 704 (1966 & Supp. 1986). In contrast, the document
executed by Mrs. Shorter released the hospital and the physician only from responsibility for unfavorable reactions or untoward results due to her refusal to permit a blood
transfusion.
92. See generally WATCH TOWER BIBLE AND TRACT SOCIETY OF PENNSYLVANIA, JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES AND THE QUESTIONS OF BLOOD 29 (1977).

This publication provides

the following suggested release language, which it attributes to a form recommended by
the American Medical Association.:
I (We) request that no blood or blood derivatives be administered to
[name] during this hospitalization, notwithstanding that such treatment may be
deemed necessary in the opinion of the attending physician or his [or her] assistants to preserve life or promote recovery. I (We) release the attending physician, his [or her] assistants, the hospital and its personnel from any
responsibility whatever for any untoward results due to my (our) refusal to permit the use of blood or its derivatives.
93. Id. One court has held that, even if such a release were executed, the physicians
should not be held responsible for refusing to operate. Davis v. United States, 629 F.
Supp. 1, 2-3 (E.D. Ark. 1986) ("A physician, under the law, does not have to engage in
what he believes honestly to be bad medical practice simply because he is held harmless
from potential legal liability."). The court in Davis also held that the defendant physicians in that malpractice action were under no duty to refer the Jehovah's Witness patient to other physicians who would agree to perform "bloodless" surgery. Id. at 5.
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plex medical-legal dilemma. Regrettably, the court refused to address what it recognized as "difficult constitutional questions not
capable of easy resolution.19 4 As Judge McAuliffe critically observed in dissent, "That we cannot resolve every issue in a single
case is hardly reason to refuse to begin." 9 5

94. 306 Md. at 565, 510 A.2d at 566.
95. Id. at 567, 510 A.2d at 567 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).

